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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NAFTA LAW
Melissa Long
I. INTRODUCTION
NDER chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment ("NAFTA"), the signatory countries are allowed to select
an alternative forum for any antidumping and countervailing
duty cases which may arise.1 Parties are permitted to present their ap-
peals to a NAFTFA Binational Panel ("Panel") under Article 1904 of
NAFTA. 2 This Panel uses the "statutes, legislative history, regulations,
administrative practice, and judicial precedents" of the importing country
to decide if the country applied these antidumping and countervailing
duty laws appropriately in that situation.3 This article serves as a brief
update of matters decided by the NAFTA Binational Panel from May
2008 to July 2008.
II. CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER PRODUCTS
FROM CANADA
On June 25, 2008, the Panel issued a decision on a motion to dismiss
the challenge by Wynndel Box & Lumber Co. ("Wynndel") and Gorman
Bros. Lumber, Ltd. ("Gorman") that the U.S. Department of Com-
merce's ("Commerce") determination on March 3, 2006 that "certain
end-matched lumber products entering the United States under Harmo-
nized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS") Subheading
4409.10.05 were within the scope of the Softwood Lumber Orders. ' 4
Commerce argued that the matter was moot because all of the issues that
arose in connection with the Softwood Lumber Orders were resolved in
October 2006 when those Orders were revoked without the possibility of
reinstatement according to the Softwood Lumber Agreement of 2006
("SLA 2006").- Wynndel and Gorman contended that the "matter [was]
not moot because the terms of the SLA 2006 subject their end-matched
lumber products to Canadian export taxes" which brought their claims
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 19, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 683 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Id.
3. Id. at art. 1902.
4. NAFTA Article 1904 Dispute Resolution Panel, In re Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada; Final Scope Ruling Regarding Entries Made Under HTSUS
4409.10.05, Secretariat File No. USA-CDA-2006-1904-05 (June 25, 2008), [herein-
after Decision of the Panel] available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/naftal9/
lumber-dumping-cvd-scope-naftal9.pdf.
5. Id. at 2.
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within the "'ongoing collateral consequences' exception to the mootness
doctrine."'6 They argued that Commerce had erred in placing their prod-
ucts within the scope of determination, and they should not have been
included within the scope of the SLA 2006. 7
In March 2006, Commerce made the controversial determination that
"end-matched lumber products were covered by the Softwood Lumber
Orders." 8 Then, in April, Wynndel requested a panel review of Com-
merce's Final Scope Ruling and in May 2006, Gorman also entered a chal-
lenge.9 On October 2, 2006, the Softwood Lumber Orders were revoked
pursuant to Article III(1)(a) of the SLA 2006, effective retroactively to
May 22, 2002.10 Over "14 months after the SLA 2006 was signed and the
Softwood Lumber Orders were revoked," on December 7, 2007, this
Panel was appointed.11
"The scope of the SLA 2006 is defined by Annex 1A of the Agree-
ment," which explicitly includes "end matched lumber products classifia-
ble under HTSUS subheading 4409.10.05" as part of the SLA 2006.12 The
Panel concluded that there was nothing in either the language of the SLA
2006 itself or the Annex which would indicate that the scope of the SLA
2006 is to be "governed by any determinations concerning the scope of
the Softwood Lumber Orders. 1 3 In fact, the SLA 2006 provides that
only by agreement between Canada and the United States can any prod-
ucts be added or removed. 14
Commerce moved to dismiss the complaints on the grounds that the
revocation of the Softwood Lumber Orders in October 2006 and the re-
fund of all antidumping and countervailing duty deposits rendered the
claims of Wynndel and Gorman moot. 15 In response, Wynndel and
Gorman argued that "their claims are not moot because they continue to
suffer adverse collateral consequences from Commerce's allegedly unlaw-
ful scope determination in the form of Canadian export taxes imposed
pursuant to the SLA 2006."16
NAFTA Article 1904.3 explains the jurisdiction of the Panel. When
read with NAFTA Annex 1911, one can see that the Panel's jurisdiction
parallels the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International Trade
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.; Final Scope Ruling Regarding Entries Made Under HTSUS 4409.10.05, Case
Nos. A-122-838/C-122-839, Pub. Doc. 7184 (March 3, 2006); A-122-838, C-122-839:
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 71 Fed. Reg. 26050 (Dep't of
Commerce May 3, 2006).
9. Decision of the Panel, supra note 4, at 3.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id.
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("CIT"). 17 Since the CIT is only given jurisdiction over actions com-
menced under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, the Panel determined it was only given
the authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B) to review specific deter-
minations made by Commerce which fall under § 1516a(a)(2)(B). 18 The
CIT and Panel are given the specific jurisdiction to review a scope deter-
mination by Commerce "as to whether a particular type of merchandise is
within the class or kind of merchandise described in an existing finding of
dumping or antidumping or countervailing duty order." 19
The Panel concluded that because the Softwood Lumber Orders were
revoked in October 2006 and the revocation was retroactive, the Soft-
wood Lumber Orders no longer existed. 20 Therefore, the Final Scope
Ruling which Wynndel and Gorman sought review of did not fall under
the jurisdictional limitation placed on the Panel by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv) because there was "not a determination ... [to be
made].., in an existing ... antidumping or countervailing duty order. '21
Because the Panel concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C.
§1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi), it dismissed the Complaints. 22 Furthermore, the
Panel found that the "express terms of the SLA 2006 preclude any review
by this Panel" because executive agreements like the SLA 2006 are not
matters the Panel has jurisdiction over.2 3
Additionally, the Panel rejected the argument by Gorman that "admin-
istrative determinations interpreting antidumping or countervailing duty
orders survive revocation of the orders they interpret." 24 The Panel ex-
plained that Gorman "incorrectly equates an administrative practice with
an administrative determination. ' 25  The Panel clarified that
"[a]dministrative practices survive the revocation of orders ... because
such practices may be followed in reviewable administrative determina-
tions made pursuant to other orders." 2 6 But administrative determina-
tions cannot "survive revocation of the orders they interpret because they
manifest the application of an administrative practice only in the circum-
stances of the revoked order. '27
In support of this decision, the Panel pointed to the Federal Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which made a similar conclusion that an
administrative determination does not survive a revocation.2 8 In that
case, the D.C. Circuit concluded that after the permanent revocation of
17. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006) ("The Court of International Trade shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under section 516A").
18. Decision of the Panel, supra note 4, at 7.
19. Id. at 8; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2006).








28. Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. v. United States, 471 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
2009]
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orders, "the SLA render[ed] the underlying . . .determination void."'29
For further support, the Panel looked to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit30 and another NAFTA panel which both reached this
same conclusion.31
The Panel then explained that even if it did have jurisdiction over the
matter, it would have dismissed the Complaints as moot.32 Because the
Panel was sitting "in the stead of a federal court," it was "limited to the
review of live cases or controversies" which the Panel could affect a rem-
edy.33 While the Panel believed that it may have had the authority at one
point in time to remand the Final Scope Ruling, "the revocation of the
Softwood Lumber Orders nullified that authority and rendered the Com-
plainants' claims moot" and the Panel could not give relief.34
Finally, the Panel addressed the Complainants' argument that the con-
tinuing collateral consequences warranted that the dismissal of the moot
case be avoided.35 The Panel determined that a ruling would still not
relieve the Complainants of these collateral consequences because a deci-
sion by the Panel would only be advisory and prohibited.36 This is be-
cause the SLA 2006 provides for specific mechanisms by which its scope
can be challenged. Even if the Panel were to remand the case because it
determined that the lumber products were indeed outside the scope of
the Softwood Lumber Orders, this determination would not alter the
scope of the SLA 2006 and the ruling would be advisory.37
III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Panel concluded that the Final Scope Ruling was not
properly before the Panel and it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue.
Additionally, the Panel further clarified that even if it did in fact have
jurisdiction over this complaint, the prohibitive scope of the SLA 2006
would render any decision made by the Panel advisory and therefore pro-
hibited under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The Panel granted
Commerce's motion to dismiss the complaints. 38
29. Id. at 1333.
30. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1338-39 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
31. Decision of the Panel, supra note 4, at 11.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id.; see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
34. Decision of the Panel, supra note 4, at 13.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 14-15.
38. Id. at 16.
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